Lost in the Mail: A Field Experiment on Crime by Castillo, Marco et al.
Georgia State University 
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University 
ExCEN Working Papers Experimental Economics Center 
1-1-2009 
Lost in the Mail: A Field Experiment on Crime 
Marco Castillo 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
Ragan Petrie 
Georgia State University 
Maximo Torero 
International Food Policy Research Institute 
Angelino Viceisza 
International Food Policy Research Institute 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/excen_workingpapers 
Recommended Citation 
Castillo, Marco; Petrie, Ragan; Torero, Maximo; and Viceisza, Angelino, "Lost in the Mail: A Field 
Experiment on Crime" (2009). ExCEN Working Papers. 91. 
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/excen_workingpapers/91 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Experimental Economics Center at ScholarWorks @ 
Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in ExCEN Working Papers by an authorized 
administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@gsu.edu. 
Lost in the Mail: A Field Experiment on Crime
Marco Castillo a,∗, Ragan Petrie b, Maximo Torero c, Angelino Viceisza c
a School of Public Policy, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA 30332, USA
b Department of Economics, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA 30303, USA
c International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC 20006, USA
January 2009
Abstract: Crime in the mail sector can hamper the development of elec-
tronic markets. We use a field experiment to detect crime and measure its
differential impacts. We subtly, and realistically, manipulate the content and
information available in mail sent to households and detect high levels of
shirking and stealing. Eighteen percent of the mail never arrived at its des-
tination, and even more was lost if there was even a slight hint of something
additional inside the envelope. Our study demonstrates that privatization
has been unable to extricate moral hazard and that crime is strategic and
not equally distributed across the population.
* This work was completed while Castillo and Petrie were on leave at the Interdisciplinary Center for
Economic Science (ICES) at George Mason University. We are grateful to Dan Houser and the Mercatus
Center for their hospitality. We thank David Solis for conducting the follow-up survey and Cesar Ciudad for
coordinating the mail recipients. Seminar participants at ICES, Georgia Institute of Technology, Virginia
Commonwealth University, the World Bank, the Workshop on Economics Experiments in Developing
Countries at CIRANO in Montreal, and the 2007 North American Economic Science Association Meetings
in Tucson gave helpful comments.
1. Introduction
An important condition for markets to develop and thrive is to have an
efficient system for transporting goods and services. Without this, transac-
tion costs may be too high to support some markets, and only consumers
with sufficient means may be able to participate. To expand the breadth
and depth of markets, including electronic trade, a well-functioning, low-cost
mail delivery system is needed. Inefficiency and crime in the system can
hinder markets from developing, as well as prospering.
In many developing countries, corrupt behavior in the provision of public
services is not only widespread but can create important inefficiencies and
inequities (Bertrand, Djankov, Hanna, Mullainathan, 2007; Hunt and Laszlo,
2008; Reinikka and Svensson, 2005). In an environment where the provision
of public services is privatized, it is not clear if such behavior is lessened or
not. In this paper, we show that in the presence of moral hazard, even private
firms providing public services, such as mail delivery, can face a significant
level of corrupt and strategic behavior. Importantly, we show that this has
equity consequences. The cost of crime is not equally shared by all citizens
— the middle class suffers the most.
Indeed, theory and casual observation would suggest that people may
be affected differentially by crime and that crime may be strategic. Becker
(1968) theoretically shows that neither the participation in illegal activities
nor the diseconomies caused by criminal activities are expected to be uni-
formly distributed across the population. Also, several authors have provided
evidence that the social and private benefits and costs associated with com-
mitting a crime are important to determine its incidence.1 Deterrence, the
risk of being caught, and social norms all seem to be important factors in
1For examples of empirical and experimental work, see See Erlich (1973), Levitt (1997),
Duggan and Levitt (2002), Glaeser, Scheinkman and Sacerdote (1996), Jacob and Lefgren
(2003), Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003, 2004), Olken (2007), Fisman and Miguel (2007),
Reinikka and Svensson (2004) and Armantier and Boly (2008), among others.
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deciding whether to commit a crime or not.
We use a unique field experiment that allows us to develop a behavioral
measure of crime. The design measures which segments of the population are
more likely to suffer from crime and whether this conforms with economic
rationality broadly understood. Our study concentrates on the delivery of
mail, and we do so for several reasons. First, the existence of a reliable
mail sector is considered to be instrumental in the growth of electronic trade
(World Bank, 2009). Second, mail services are widely used by all segments
of the population. Third, as we will describe, mail delivery is amenable to
field experimentation with little or no intrusion. Fourth, mail delivery is
a highly decentralized activity likely to suffer from moral hazard problems
regardless of ownership. For instance, sources of lost non-certified mail are
nearly impossible to detect. Finally, crime in the mail sector is expected to
be highly correlated with the expected gains and losses of committing a crime
and much less with social pathologies. That is, it is a crime of opportunity
that can allow us to understand the economic motivation behind crime.
We develop a novel and simple empirical strategy to measure the probabil-
ity that a piece of mail arrives at its destination. We send identical envelopes
to different households in Lima, Peru from two American cities and record
arrivals. The experiment includes a large population of volunteer households
across neighborhoods of different socio-economic backgrounds. To better un-
derstand the motivation behind the commission of crime, we manipulated
the contents, the sender of the mail and the gender of the recipient. In par-
ticular, every household was sent four envelopes over the course of a year.
Two envelopes had a sender with a foreign name and two had the last name
of the sender and recipient matched. Finally, one of each of the two envelopes
contained something inside the enclosed card (a small amount of money) that
could not be easily detected without careful attention. The other envelope
just contained the enclosed card. All these modifications were as subtle as
possible and the order in which each different envelope was sent was random.
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By manipulating the information made available to the person handling
the mail, our design allows us to test several hypothesis behind the commis-
sion of crime. First, mail can be lost because the cost of delivery is larger
than the cost of being caught shirking. Lost mail might be a reflection of
apathy rather than crime. Therefore, comparing rates of lost mail contain-
ing money with those not containing money permits us to detect if crime is
taking place. Second, if those handling mail behave strategically, one would
expect that they will make use of information on the social distance between
the recipient and the sender and the characteristics of the recipient. There-
fore, comparing similar pieces of mail across subgroups can potentially reveal
the expectations of those handling the mail. For instance, if a letter from
a family member is more likely to contain something of value (i.e. money),
then letters from family members would be lost at a higher rate.
The experiments show first that the mail service in Peru is highly ineffi-
cient. The overall rate of mail lost is 18%.2 The loss rate, however, hides the
fact that mail containing money is lost 21% of the time while mail contain-
ing no money is lost 15% of the time. That is, we find evidence of shirking
as well as crime. Also, the quality of service is not independent of socio-
economic status. Mail is lost at the same rate (roughly 18%), whether it
contains money or not, when sent to a poor neighborhood. When sent to a
rich neighborhood, however, mail without money is lost only 10% of the time
and mail with money is lost 17% of the time. This suggests loss is happening
within Peru rather than the U.S. We confirm that given the geographical
distribution of post offices, this cannot be attributed to a lack of manpower.
Our approach has several advantages. By randomly assigning treatments
to different populations, it provides the necessary counterfactuals to test the
presence of strategic behavior. The study also avoids potential biases due
2Compared to the less than 0.5% of mail reported lost in the U.S. or the U.K., this is
very large. Note that loss rates in the U.S. and the U.K. are for reported mail lost. This
will underestimate the problem if not all mail lost is reported. Our experimental measure
is for all mail lost that should have arrived at a destination.
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to experimenter effects by using an existing service that likely suffers from
moral hazard problems. By using a widely used service and careful selection
of the sample, our study overcomes the criticisms of lack of external validity.
Finally, our study provides a behavioral measure of crime that avoids common
measurement problems and underreporting.
Our research makes several contributions. First, it shows that there still
remains high barriers to expand commerce that relies on the mail sector to
transport goods and services. Second, it speaks to the problems that devel-
oping countries face when trying to solve inefficiencies through privatization
of public services. Private firms suffer the same asymmetric information that
governments do. The fact that subtle changes in the characteristics of en-
velopes generate adjustments in behavior suggests that mechanisms based
on random checks (Becker and Stigler, 1976) might be too difficult or costly
to implement. Third, our research presents new evidence that crime is not
shared equally. The middle class is taxed more heavily. Finally, our research
shows that crime is strategic and depends on expectations and the probability
of being caught.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents our hy-
potheses on crime. Section 3 presents a description of the Peruvian postal
system. Section 4 presents the experimental design and Section 5 the results.
In Section 6, we run robustness checks, and Section 7 concludes.
2. Hypotheses on Crime
Our experiment allows us to look at crime in equilibrium. By varying
the content and information available on each piece of mail, we can better
understand the strategy of crime and who suffers the most from crime. Below
we present some hypotheses on how our manipulations will affect mail loss.
We posit that the incidence of crime in equilibrium is a function of the
probability of being caught stealing and the probability that the victim has
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something of value to steal.3 In the context of the mail sector, this implies
that mail loss will be a function of the probability that the postal worker
will be fired or punished if caught stealing mail and the probability, or the
expectation, that the sender of a piece of mail includes something of value.
Specifically, we would expect that mail loss will decline as the probability
of being caught stealing increases and as the probability that mail is valuable
decreases. So, as it becomes easier to identify the person responsible for mail
loss, because of monitoring on the side of the firm or complaints on the side
of the customer, mail loss should decline. Also, as the piece of mail signals
that it might contain something of value, mail loss should increase.
In our experiment, we manipulate information that we expect to affect
these probabilities and record mail loss. For example, by making the enve-
lope slightly thicker with something inserted inside, we expect mail loss to
increase as postal workers may suspect there is something of value. Also,
by decreasing the social distance between the sender and the recipient, such
as having the sender be a family member, we expect mail loss to increase.
By sending mail to different neighborhoods, we can see if mail loss decreases
in wealthier neighborhoods, relative to poorer neighborhoods, because we
would expect that the rich are more likely to complain if mail does not ar-
rive. The effects, however, may be nonlinear. While we expect service to be
better as neighborhood income rises, this will interact with the expectation
that recipients have something of value to send. People who live in wealthier
neighborhoods may be more likely to have something of value to send, but
they may also be more likely to pay a higher price for more secure services.
3Becker (1968) and Erlich (1973) present detailed models of decision making by individ-
uals considering committing a crime. The interaction between a mailman and a customer
can be thought of as a zero-sum game. If a person sends valuables with probability one
and there is moral hazard, mail will be certainly stolen. If the mailman never steals, a
customer might feel safe sending valuables in the mail. In equilibrium, one would expect
that those customers that have a larger marginal benefit of using the mail to send valu-
ables will face a larger average level of crime. Hypotheses on the effects of costs, benefits
and the probability of detection on crime can be derived from a standard principal-agent
model where wages are a function of unobservable effort on the part of the mailman.
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Recipients in poor neighborhoods may not be expected to receive anything
of value, so mailmen may not bother to look carefully.
In sum, we expect mail loss to increase as the probability of being caught
stealing declines and the probability of valuables increases. The relation-
ship across neighborhoods may be nonlinear because the probability that
something of value is being sent will depend on the recipient’s likelihood of
receiving something of value and the likelihood that the recipient has alter-
native means for receiving valuables.
3. Mail in Peru
We look at the incidence and nature of lost mail sent from the U.S. to
Peru. To better understand how and where crime may be happening, below
we briefly describe the Peruvian postal system and how mail is delivered.
The postal system in Peru is a private concession of the Peruvian govern-
ment and was privatized in 1991. The company does not have exclusive rights
to deliver letters, as is the case in the U.S., but practically speaking, they
are the only provider of low-cost, non-package mail service in Peru. There
are alternative means for sending mail, including certified services offered by
the post office, but they are very expensive, costing about 100-200% more
depending on the destination.
Mail sent from overseas arrives in Peru at a central processing facility
located in the capital city Lima. The facility sorts all mail, domestic and
international, and sends it to large district or regional administration offices
in Lima or other regions in Peru for further sorting and delivery. There are
also small post office branches where further sorting of mail for delivery may
occur. Some branches offer mail pick-up services as well. There are nine
administration offices in Lima with an average of 72 employees per office,
and there are 39 branches with an average of 2.5 employees per branch. The
administration offices employ mail workers, mail carriers, and management.
The post office branches employ workers and carriers. Mail carriers are paid
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a fixed salary, slightly higher than the minimum wage, and many have steady
employment.
The mail sector in Peru was privatized with the goal of making it more
efficient. It is also a monopoly provider of low-cost mail service, which could
make it less efficient. And, it is a decentralized system, with mail sort-
ing occurring at various places, which makes it difficult to monitor. These
characteristics make an ideal environment to examine strategic behavior and
crime.
4. Experimental Design
The experiment provides a behavioral measure of crime. We send en-
velopes from the United States to Peru through the normal mail services in
both countries (U.S. Postal Service and the Peruvian postal service, respec-
tively). We use a list of residential addresses in metropolitan Lima, Peru that
are geographically representative of poor, middle, and high income neighbor-
hoods. A resident of each address is the recipient of the envelope and reports
to us if the envelope arrives or not.
The 2 x 2 design we employ varies the contents of the envelope and the
sender’s name. The contents of the envelope is a card and either two $1 bills
folded in half or no money. The sender’s name is either a foreign name (i.e. J.
Tucker, M. Scott) or the same family name as the recipient (i.e. M. Sosa, L.
Cordova).4 Varying the sender’s name allows us to test if names signal that
something of value is in the envelope (i.e. money). The design is outlined in
Table 1 and includes the number of envelopes sent in each treatment.
To get a valid estimate of crime, it is important that the envelope look
realistic and like something that would normally be sent in the mail. So, we
chose an opaque solid-colored envelope and card (of the same color). The
4In South America, including Peru, everyone has two last names. The first is the last
name from the father and the second is the last name of the mother. We use the first last
name.
7
envelope looks like one that would be sent for a birthday or other special
occasion. Keeping with that idea, on the inside of each card, we hand-
write “Happy Birthday” or “Feliz Cumpleaños” — depending on the return
addressee’s name — and sign Josh or Mike or Marco or Luis. We do this be-
cause if the card is stolen or opened, we want it to appear, to the mailman,
like it was actually sent by the person whose name appears on the front of
the card. Figure 1 gives examples of two of the envelopes that were sent to
the same address in the course of the study. To preserve confidentiality, we
have blacked out the addresses of the sender and recipient and the recipient’s
first name. The first envelope gives an example of mail sent by a foreigner to
a recipient and the second envelope gives an example of mail from a family
member to a recipient.
Because the envelope is opaque, the greeting inside the card cannot be
seen. If the card contains money, this also cannot be seen, even if held up
to the light. One can, however, feel that there is something in the envelope
because the folded two $1 bills make a very subtle bump. It is impossible
to determine what exactly is in the envelope.5 But, there is a hint that
the envelope contains something other than the card. We chose this subtle
manipulation so that anyone looking for something to steal would need to
pay careful attention for signs that the envelope contained something that
might be worth stealing.
All envelopes have handwritten addresses, stamps for postage and an
airmail stamp on the front of the envelope. There are two return addresses
in Atlanta and two inWashington, DC. All addresses are real so that we could
monitor if the card was returned to the U.S. for any reason. The envelopes are
glued shut, making it difficult to steam open, reseal and deliver. Envelopes
are always mailed from one of two locations. Envelopes with a return address
5We could very well have placed folded pieces of paper in the envelope instead of money,
but we want the envelopes and contents to be realistic, especially in case the envelope was
lost or stolen. This is in line with the long-held tradition in experimental economics of
avoiding subject deception.
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from Atlanta were mailed from the main post office in downtown Atlanta,
and envelopes with a return address of Washington DC were mailed from
a post office mailbox in Washington DC. The color of the envelope, the
return address and the handwriting on the envelope are randomized across
the four treatments.6 Envelopes were sent during the period November 2006
- November 2007.
Mailboxes in Peru are secure and not exposed to theft from people passing
by on the street. Typically mail is placed in a locked mail box inside a locked
gate or entryway. Or, it is placed under the door of the locked residence. Mail
is not left in post boxes on the streets, as is the case in the U.S.
To find recipient addresses, we tapped into two networks of people who
engage in research to recruit volunteers willing to receive the cards and report
to us.7 The two networks include people from a variety of demographic and
income groups. The important design element for us was that the addresses
where the mail was sent were geographically diverse. So, even though the
mail recipients might know one another, the addresses are disperse across
locations. To minimize the number of addresses in the study for any given
post office, no more than four households were within a 1-kilometer radius of
each other (i.e. 0.62 miles or the equivalent of ten blocks). We mapped all the
recipient addresses using GIS to minimize agglomeration and also to verify
that the addresses were correct and active. This ensures that non-arrival of
mail is not due to an incorrect address.
Recipients of the mail reported the arrival or non-arrival of each envelope
and kept any money if an envelope with money arrived. They were instructed
to not ask the mailman about the card or go to the post office to enquire.
After the envelope was put in the mail in the U.S., we sent an e-mail to
the recipients telling them that an envelope was sent. They were instructed
to inform us when it arrived, who is was from, the color, and the contents.
6We did this to insure that each envelope sent to a household by a different person was
indeed handwritten by a different person.
7We opted for this method to ensure honest reporting.
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They were not told ahead of time the characteristics of the envelope or if
the envelope contained money. This was done to ensure no a priori bias in
reporting.
To compensate recipients for their time and help, at the end of the exper-
iment, we conducted a lottery with cash prizes for recipients who reported.
Recipients knew of the lottery before we began sending envelopes. To verify
mail receipt responses, in December 2007, we conducted a follow-up survey
to responses and collect more individual data on mail recipients. This also
allowed us to verify for a second time that addresses were correct. All ad-
dresses were verified, and all previous responses were confirmed. This gives
us confidence that our data are accurate.8
5. Results
We would like to know the patterns of mail loss geographically, across
various demographic characteristics and across our treatments. We first turn
to a description of the sample, then main findings, evidence of strategic crime
and finally robustness checks.
5.1. Sample Selection
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics on the individual and geographical
characteristics of the mail recipients. The sample is split roughly half and
half between male and female recipients. The distribution of residents across
low, middle and high-income neighborhoods is not evenly distribution, with
more people living in middle-income neighborhoods.9 Most recipients have
8We asked the recipient if they received an envelope during a certain period of time
and asked the recipient to report the return address and color of the envelope. Recipients
were able to correctly confirm reports from 4-5 months earlier.
9Low-income neighborhoods are ones where the percent of the population considered
poor is 30% or higher. Middle-income neighborhoods are those where the percentage is
between 10-30%, and high-income neighborhoods are those where the percentage is less
than 10%. We show later that our results are robust to other definitions of economic
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a university education, are married or living with their partner and have a
family member that lives in the United States. This latter result is important
as it makes receipt of a card from the United States not seem strange and
also attests to the degree of mail that could potentially come from the United
States. Recipients have lived in their current residence for an average of 16.5
years, and the nearest post office is three minutes away.
An important component of our experimental design, in addition to a di-
verse and representative distribution of individual mail recipient characteris-
tics, is that the distribution of recipient addresses is geographically disperse
across neighborhoods and post offices and is representative of metropolitan
Lima. Figure 2 shows the geographical distribution of residents in our study.
The residents cover the majority of the city. There are fewer residents in
some of the peri-urban areas of the city, but the addresses are nicely dis-
tributed across neighborhoods. This gives us observations across most areas
of Lima and confidence that our results apply to the larger, city-wide mail
sector.
5.2. Main Findings
Turning to loss rates, we see that mail service in Lima is inefficient and
subject to crime. Table 3 shows loss rates overall and by income groups.
Overall, 18% of all envelopes sent through the mail never arrived at their
destination. Envelopes with money were less likely to arrive than envelopes
without money, so it does not appear that mail loss is solely due to bad ser-
vice. This hints more of criminal activity. Over 21% of envelopes with money
did not arrive, whereas 14.8% of envelopes without money did not arrive.
This 50% increase in loss is statistically significant (one-side p-value=0.023).
How was mail lost across our four treatments? The bottom panel of
status. The proportion of people living in poverty is from the latest poverty map (2006)
calculated by the Peruvian Ministry of Economy and Finance using expenditure surveys
from the Peruvian Institute of Statistics.
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Table 3 shows loss rates by the contents of the envelope and the sender’s
last name. Again, envelopes with money were more likely to be lost than
those without money, whether or not the sender’s last name was foreign or
a family name. The difference between money and no money envelopes for
envelopes with a foreign sender is not significantly larger, but the almost 10
percentage point difference for envelopes with a family last name is (one-sided
p-value=0.023). Indeed, most loss happened for envelopes with money sent
by a family member. Almost one in four of those envelopes never arrived.
Across low, middle and high-income neighborhoods, mail is lost at dif-
ferent rates. Table 4 shows residents in middle-income neighborhoods lose
mail at the highest rate, 20.4%, and those in high-income neighborhoods
lose mail at the lowest rate, 13.5%. The loss rate in middle-income income
neighborhoods is significantly larger than in high-income neighborhoods.10
One might wonder if mail loss can be attributed to the Peruvian mail
service or to the U.S. Postal Service. The results in Table 4 suggest that
lost mail is happening on the Peruvian side. While it may be reasonable to
think that envelopes with money might be lost on the U.S. side, it is highly
unlikely that the significantly different loss rates we see across middle and
high-income neighborhoods is due to the U.S. Postal Service. Such loss rates
cannot exist without knowledge of neighborhoods in Lima. The next section
provides further evidence of this.
Looking at the contents of the envelopes, mail with money is significantly
more likely to be lost than without money in middle-income neighborhoods.
In middle-income neighborhoods the loss rate of envelopes with money is
over 10 percentage points larger than for envelopes without money. The loss
rate in poor neighborhoods is around 18% and is similar for envelopes with
and without money. High-income neighborhoods have an almost 7 percentage
point increase for envelopes with money, but this is not significantly different.
10One-sided t-tests yield p-values of 0.098 comparing low to high-income loss rates and
0.045 comparing middle to high-income loss rates.
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This pattern of loss is consistent with an expectation that the poor are
not sending valuables by mail, so loss rates are no different with and without
money. The loss rates in poor neighborhoods seem to be more a reflection
of poor service, rather than crime. Loss rates in middle-income and high-
income neighborhoods, however, are consistent with the expectation that
these populations have valuable items to send through the mail. Search is
relatively larger in middle-income neighborhoods, and this may reflect an ex-
pectation that people in middle-income neighborhoods have few alternatives
for sending mail.
The pattern of loss across neighborhoods is primarily driven by envelopes
where the sender and recipient share the same last name. This result is
important because it suggests that those handling the mail attribute a similar
probability of being caught across neighborhoods when disposing of mail sent
by non-family members. It also suggests that mail from a family member is
given special attention since loss rates vary across neighborhoods.
Across the gender of the recipient, women suffer larger losses in poor
neighborhoods and men suffer larger losses in rich neighborhoods. The loss
rate for women in poor neighborhoods is higher than that for men, and
the loss rate for men in high-income neighborhoods is higher than that for
women. It is important to note that there are more women in poor neighbor-
hoods than men and more men in high income neighborhoods than women.
Those handling the mail may perceive that mishandling women’s mail in
poor neighborhoods carries less risk of complaints.
5.3. Evidence of Strategic Crime
The main findings show that mail with money is lost more frequently and
that crime is not distributed equally across the population. The mechanism
for loss seems to be that envelopes coming from family members are scruti-
nized more closely than those from a foreigner. In this section, we look more
closely at the patterns of loss and why they might exist.
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Table 5 shows the joint effect of income and money on crime. For men,
there is a level increase in loss across all neighborhoods when there is money
in the envelope. For women, money does not have an effect, but neighborhood
income does, with worse service in low-income neighborhoods.
The numbers in the table also allow us to calculate a difference-in-difference
estimate of the effect of income on crime using our treatments variables. The
presence of money in envelopes sent by a family member increases the rate
of mail lost by 16.1 percentage points (30.9% - 14.8%) in middle-income
neighborhoods and decreases it by 1.4 percentage points (18.2% - 19.6%) in
poor neighborhoods. In other words, people are 17.5 percentage points more
likely to keep envelopes sent to middle-income neighborhoods when there is
suspicion of valuable content. A comparison of the richer neighborhoods and
poorer neighborhoods gives a similar estimate (15.0). This increase in the
likelihood of loss from poor to middle and poor to rich neighborhoods could
be due to expectations that something of value might be sent in the mail or
the perceived larger risk of being caught.
The results in Table 6 show that both expectations that the envelope
contains something of value and the probability of being caught, which varies
by the socioeconomic level of the neighborhood, explain loss rates. The last
four columns in the table present results from a fixed-effects logit regression
of loss on whether the envelope contained money, it was sent by a family
member and interactions with neighborhood income (percent classified as
poor) and whether the recipient is male. The dependent variable equals 1 if
the mail did not arrive at its destination and 0 otherwise.11
The third and fourth columns show results for the subsamples of mail sent
by a family member and by a foreigner. By looking only at envelopes from
family members or from foreigners, we attempt to keep constant the expected
cost of committing a crime, so that we can focus on expectations that the
11The same results hold with a fixed-effects linear probability model.
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envelope contains something of value.12 We see that the effect of money
for envelopes coming from family members, controlling for the gender of the
recipient and recipient fixed effects, is stronger as neighborhoods become
wealthier. There is no significant effect of envelopes coming from foreigners.
This confirms the results in Table 5 and suggests that expectations matter.
This is so because we expect not only that both the rich and the poor care
about receiving mail but that the cost of being caught stealing should not
decrease with the wealth of the neighborhood. The fact that envelopes with
money are lost at a higher rate as neighborhood income goes up says people
seem to expect mail to contain something of value when sent to wealthier
neighborhoods.
The results in the fifth and sixth columns of the regression on money and
non-money envelopes are also indicative of incentives. The previous regres-
sion on family envelopes suggests that people perceive family envelopes from
richer neighborhoods to contain valuables. So, we would expect that the ef-
fect of family on money envelopes to be stronger in richer neighborhoods, not
weaker. The fact that we do not find this suggests that there is a counter-
acting force limiting the incentive to commit a crime. Since larger expected
costs of being caught reduce the incentives to steal, this result is consistent
with the belief that the probability of being caught stealing is larger in richer
neighborhoods.
All together, these results suggest that there is an expectation of valuables
sent through the mail as neighborhood income rises and this interacts with
an increasing probability of being caught. This gives us a nonlinear effect of
12This is a difference-in-difference estimate on the net benefit (expectation of something
of value less the expected cost of being caught) of an envelope with and without money
across neighborhoods. Or, re-written, this is the net expectation of encountering something
of value less the net cost of being caught taking something of value. By splitting the sample
into envelopes from family members and from foreigners, we can control for the net cost
of being caught across neighborhoods. We expect this to be constant, since otherwise this
would say that the rich care less about receiving mail with money. So, any significant
effect on money or money interacted with neighborhood will be due to expectations.
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neighborhood income on loss rates and a higher level of loss in middle-income
neighborhoods.
6. Robustness Checks
This section presents regression analysis of mail loss rates to test the
robustness of the results to omitted variables and specification assumptions.
We check that our main results are not due to recipient-level fixed effects, our
definition of neighborhood grouping by income, correlation between neigh-
borhood income and the way mail is processed, misreporting, or other socio-
economic variables. Table 7 presents logit regression marginal effects for a
dummy variable that equals 1 if the mail did not arrive at its destination
and 0 otherwise. Each regression presents the effect of covariates on different
subpopulations.13
The second column in Table 7 and the second column in Table 6 confirm
our first basic result. Envelopes containing money are more likely to get lost.
The results in Table 6 confirm that this holds with recipient-level fixed effects,
and the results in Table 7 confirm it holds as does the nonlinear relationship
with neighborhood income (percent classified as poor). This latter result
still holds even controlling for the manner in which mail is processed across
neighborhoods. The results are intuitive. Mail sent to neighborhoods with an
administrative center might be lost more frequently because there are many
more employees handling the mail and this helps to dissipate responsibility.
Neighborhoods with more post office branches might lose less mail because
it is easier to identify responsibility.
In Table 7, columns three and four show that the effect of neighborhood
income is stronger for the envelopes with money. The regressions dividing the
population receiving envelopes from family and non-family members confirm
that it is the envelopes with money coming from family members that are
more likely to get lost. The last two columns show that men are more likely
13The results are robust to autocorrelation and other specifications.
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to be targeted if envelopes contain money. Finally, note that the patterns of
lost mail do not seem to respond to the proximity of post offices. The number
of minutes it takes to get to the closest post office is not significant.14 This is
important because it suggests our results are not due to lack of manpower.
The results reported above also eliminate two alternative explanation for
higher loss of envelopes with money: systematic misreporting by individuals
and misreporting envelopes with money. First, since the results hold when
controlling for recipient fixed effects, individual misreporting is not causing
the differential loss with money. Second, since the recipients did not know
ahead of time what kind of envelope was sent, there is no reason to believe
that the money effect is due to people not paying attention to the money
envelopes. Also, they could keep the money and therefore did not need to say
it was lost. Finally, the nonlinear effect of income on loss rates, especially for
envelopes with money, is not what one would expect if there was differential
shirking by income. People in richer neighborhoods might care less about the
job and therefore shirk more, but that would imply more lost mail in richer
neighborhoods, not less.
The results in Table 7 are also robust to learning and the inclusion of
other socio-economic information, such as family size, time in residence and
marital status. Envelopes with money are more likely to be lost and neighbor-
hood income is nonlinearly related to loss rates.15 Also, the fact that money
envelopes are more likely to be lost, even when controlling for recipient fixed
effects, is strong evidence that this result is robust.
One final alternative explanation for our results on mail loss is that loss
is happening because household members are taking the envelopes, not the
mail service. This does not seem to be the case. In households where the
14The number of minutes to the closest post office is based on an accessibility model
which calculates the least cost path surface (based on time) from any place, using GIS. The
accessibility measure uses three different levels of roads with different speeds of movement.
15Learning is tested by the inclusion of a lagged term for loss or a dummy variable that
equals one if the first envelope did not arrive. Our main results still hold.
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recipient is a man, the more members in the household, the less likely the
mail is lost. This is not consistent with internal household crime.
7. Conclusions
Using a simple and novel field experiment that allows for crime, we ex-
amine strategic behavior in the mail sector in Lima, Peru. We hypothesize
that the very nature of mail delivery gives an opportunity to those who han-
dle the mail to “lose” mail if it is beneficial to do so. Our design allows
us to differentiate poor service from targeted crime and to investigate what
information is pertinent in crime and who suffers the most from it.
We have several key findings. First, loss rates are very high. Over 18%
of all mail sent never arrived at its destination. These losses are huge and
present large barriers for the development of efficient commerce. Second,
this high loss rate is partially explained by poor service but not completely.
Envelopes containing money were 50% more likely to be lost than those
without money. So, mail loss is not random and hints at strategic behavior.
Third, when the sender’s last name matched the recipient’s last name, the
mail was almost twice as likely to be lost if it contained money. Clearly,
those who handle the mail are looking for clues that might suggest that
an envelope holds something of value. Fourth, middle-income neighborhoods
suffer the highest loss rates and high-income neighborhoods suffer the lowest.
This result (and the previous) lends support for the crime occurring in Peru
rather than the U.S. since it would require the U.S. Postal Service to know
which neighborhoods were rich or poor.
Finally, the patterns of crime we observe are consistent with expectations
that the recipient could receive something of value and the perceived prob-
ability of being caught stealing. This results in a nonlinear effect of neigh-
borhood income on loss. Looking only at mail from family members, we see
that loss increases as neighborhood income rises if the mail contains money,
suggesting that there is an expectation that residents in middle-income and
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wealthy neighborhoods may have something valuable to steal. The magni-
tude of loss is higher in middle-income neighborhoods though, supporting the
notion that the probability of being caught is more likely in wealthy neigh-
borhoods. So, we see the highest loss rates in middle-income neighborhoods
when there is a hint that the envelope contains something of value.
Put together our results suggest a model of crime where those who handle
the mail are looking for items of value to steal. Moreover, crime is not
independent of the neighborhood’s characteristics.
While our study cannot speak to the presence of large inefficiencies in all
the sectors dealing with the transaction of goods and services, it highlights
the large barriers to market development that developing economies face.
Our study further shows that private firms providing public services face in-
centives problems due to moral hazard in the same way the government does.
The nature of the good seems to be as important as the nature of ownership.
The sophistication in criminal activity found in our study suggests that in-
expensive, reliable alternatives and affordable monitoring might be difficult
to obtain. Incentive problems can prevent market development as much as
inefficiencies in governance and lack of competition do.
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Figure 1. Examples of Envelopes Sent
(To preserve confidentiality, addresses and first names are blocked)
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Figure 2: Distribution of Addresses Across Lima, Peru
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Table 1
Experimental Design
Contents of Envelope
Sender Last Name Money No Money
Foreign n=136 n=131
Family n=135 n=139
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics of Sample Recipients
Percent Std Dev # Obs
Male Recipients 47.5 141
Low Income 34.8 49
Middle Income 39.7 56
High Income 25.5 36
Age (mean, years) 37.2 10.1 124
University Education 57.4 136
Married or Cohabitating 44.1 136
Family size (mean, number) 4.1 1.5 124
Family in U.S. 47.1 136
Time in Residence (mean, years) 16.5 12.8 124
Minutes to Post Office (mean) 3.0 8.4 140
Note: some variables have missing values because of survey non-response.
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Table 3
Loss Rates
(in percent)
Overall and by Contents
Number
Overall 18.1 98
Money 21.4 58
No Money 14.8 40
Experimental Treatments
Contents of Envelope
Money No Money
Foreign 19.8 16.0
Family 23.0 13.7
Table 4
Loss Rates by Income Groups (in percent)
Low Income Middle Income High Income
Overall 18.9 20.4 13.5
Money 19.8 25.7 16.9
No Money 18.0 15.3 10.0
Foreign Sender Name 18.9 18.3 16.4
Family Sender Name 18.9 22.4 10.3
Male Recipient 14.3 20.0 20.4
Female Recipient 21.8 20.8 1.9
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Table 5
Loss Rates
by Money and Income Groups (in percent)
Envelope with Money
Low Income Middle Income High Income
Foreign Sender Name 21.3 20.4 17.1
Family Sender Name 18.2 30.9 16.7
Male Recipient 17.1 28.0 25.0
Female Recipient 21.4 23.7 3.7
Envelopes with No Money
Low Income Middle Income High Income
Foreign Sender Name 16.3 16.0 15.8
Family Sender Name 19.6 14.8 3.1
Male Recipient 11.4 12.0 15.9
Female Recipient 22.2 18.0 0.0
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Table 6
Probability of Mail Loss
Logit Fixed-Effects Regressions
All Family Foreign Money No Money
Money 0.606** 2.687** -0.106
(0.029) (0.034) (0.919)
Family 0.025 1.250 -0.922
(0.928) (0.259) (0.424)
Money*Percent Poor -0.079** -0.008
(0.027) (0.790)
Money*Man 1.117 0.817
(0.272) (0.367)
Family*Percent Poor -0.021 0.036
(0.500) (0.258)
Family*Man -0.663 -0.387
(0.476) (0.682)
Individual Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes
N 541 274 267 271 270
Log likelihood -71.96 -15.23 -15.32 -14.47 -15.52
Note: p-value in parentheses. *p-value < 0.10, **p-value < 0.05, ***p-value < 0.01.
Variables: Money=1 if envelope contained money, Family=1 if sender’s last name was the same as recipient’s,
Man=1 if recipient was a man, Percent Poor=percent of population in neighborhood living in poverty.
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Table 7
Probability of Mail Loss
Logit Regressions - Marginal Effects
All Money No Money Family Foreign Man Woman
Money 0.063* 0.099** 0.026 0.118** 0.016
(0.058) (0.040) (0.570) (0.017) (0.707)
Family 0.005 0.031 -0.020 -0.022 0.027
(0.868) (0.516) (0.621) (0.632) (0.516)
Man 0.030 0.080 -0.017 -0.004 0.067
(0.354) (0.110) (0.678) (0.930) (0.145)
Percent Poor 0.012** 0.015* 0.010 0.013* 0.012 0.013 0.025***
(0.023) (0.063) (0.155) (0.083) (0.101) (0.100) (0.004)
Percent Poor -0.000** -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000**
Squared (0.045) (0.065) (0.299) (0.152) (0.122) (0.076) (0.013)
Minutes to 0.002 0.004 -0.001 -0.000 0.003 0.009 0.001
Post Office (0.428) (0.129) (0.687) (0.941) (0.201) (0.340) (0.720)
Administrative 0.119*** 0.144** 0.092* 0.076 0.168*** 0.145** 0.075
Center (0.001) (0.010) (0.054) (0.141) (0.002) (0.012) (0.126)
Number of Post -0.028** -0.021 -0.033** -0.033** -0.021 -0.040** -0.031**
Office Branches (0.017) (0.225) (0.026) (0.046) (0.180) (0.044) (0.023)
Mailing number 0.002 -0.003 0.006 0.012 -0.011 0.017 -0.012
(1-4) (0.920) (0.910) (0.777) (0.581) (0.590) (0.442) (0.540)
N 537 269 268 272 265 258 279
Log Likelihood -239.57 -130.78 -106.02 -122.49 -114.52 -115.57 -117.28
Note: p-value in parentheses. *p-value < 0.10, **p-value < 0.05, ***p-value < 0.01.
Variables: Money=1 if envelope contained money, Family=1 if sender’s last name was the same as recipient’s,
Man=1 if recipient was a man, Percent Poor=percent of population in neighborhood living in poverty, Minutes to
post office=number of minutes from residence to closest post office, Mailing number=1 if first mailing, =2 if second
mailing, etc., Administrative Center=1 if an administrative center is located in neighborhood, Number of Post Office
Branches=number of branches in neighborhood.
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